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Book Review
Getting Causes from Powers 
Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum 
Oxford University Press, 2012. xvi+254 pp. £35.00 
reviewed by
Jennifer McKitrick 
University of Nebraska – Lincoln 
Lincoln, NE, USA 
jmckitrick2@unl.edu 
Some philosophers have suggested that having powers in one’s ontol-
ogy has the advantage of providing resources for an account of causa-
tion (see Cartwright 1999; Harré 1970; Mill 1843; Whitehead 1929). 
But what would a theory of causation look like if we assume that 
powers are real? In Getting Causes from Powers, Mumford and An-
jum make what is perhaps the first sustained attempt to answer that 
question. The basic idea is that, if there are powers, understood as 
property-like entities that have manifestations which can be merely 
possible, then causation is a matter of powers manifesting. Accord-
ing to the authors, their dispositional account of causation is a radi-
cal departure from Humean orthodoxy and has a number of surpris-
ing implications, including: causes do not necessitate their effects; a 
cause and its effect are simultaneous; and causation is non-transitive 
and non-symmetrical. Although it is not always clear whether all of 
the claims that they defend stand or fall together, each represents a 
fresh perspective on some very well-trodden ground. Such bold and 
innovative ideas are bound to provoke discussion and disagreement, 
a sampling of which is indicated below. 
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The first chapter sets out the basics of their account of causation, a 
view they call ‘causal dispositionalism.’ The authors’ ontological start-
ing point is pandispositionalism, according to which all properties are 
clusters of powers (Shoemaker 1980). An implication of this view is 
that a manifestation of a power must also be accounted for in terms of 
powers. While some have suggested that this leads to a problematic re-
gress (Armstrong 2005), the authors embrace this ‘passing around of 
powers’ as an attractive way of understanding causation. When pow-
ers manifest, they give something another power. Causation, then, is 
fundamentally a relation between powers: the power that manifests 
and the power whose instantiation constitutes that manifestation. 
Other true causal claims, such as those involving objects or events, 
are true in virtue of these more fundamental facts about powers. The 
authors stress that powers typically produce manifestations in com-
plex combinations. Furthermore, since the relation between powers 
and their manifestations is causal in nature, causal dispositionalism 
is non-reductive, a consequence that the authors gladly accept, given 
inductive skepticism about reductive analyses of causation. 
In Chapter 3, the authors argue that even a total cause does not ne-
cessitate (i.e. is not sufficient for) its effect. A dispositional account 
of causation lends itself to denying necessity, since the concept of 
‘disposing towards a certain outcome’ includes the idea that the out-
come is not thereby guaranteed. The authors’ case against necessity 
rests primarily on the antecedent strengthening argument, accord-
ing to which any necessity relation worthy of the name survives an-
tecedent strengthening (Schrenk 2010). That is, if A necessitates B, 
A and φ also necessitate B, for any φ. Due to possibilities of interfer-
ence and prevention, causal relations do not have this feature, and 
consequently ‘to cause’ is not ‘to necessitate.’ However, there is much 
here that a causal necessitarian can agree with: it is possible that ex-
actly the same cause would have the same effect, provided nothing 
else were added (67, 76); a cause makes its effect happen (84); when 
causal factors pass a certain threshold, they are enough for their ef-
fect (73); and determinism may be true (75). 
In Chapter 5, ‘Simultaneity,’ Mumford and Anjum argue that causes 
do not precede their effects but instead overlap in a continuous causal 
process. For those who claim that causes precede their effects, they 
present the following dilemma. Either an effect starts occurring as 
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soon as all the causal factors are present, or there is some delay. If 
the effect starts occurring as soon as the total cause exists, then cause 
and effect are simultaneous. If there is a temporal gap, it is not clear 
what stands in the way of the effect commencing (111). Other support 
for simultaneity comes from examples, such as two books propping 
each other up in an A-frame structure (114) and sugar in water be-
coming a sweet solution (121). Apparent counterexamples to simulta-
neity are accounted for in terms of causal processes providing pow-
ers for subsequent causal processes, but not causing those processes 
(125). Within a genuine causal process, the cause is said to ‘become’ 
its effect (119, 200). But since, on their view, this would suggest that 
one power turns into a different power, perhaps the authors are more 
accurate when they say one power is gradually replaced by another 
(124). However, this cannot be a general characterization of causa-
tion, since many powers, such as magnetism, do not typically dimin-
ish while their effects occur. 
If cause and effect are simultaneous, causal relations can be sym-
metrical. The authors offer the mutually supporting books as an ex-
ample (118). Book a causes Book b to stand and Book b causes Book 
a to stand. But in order for this to be a case of symmetrical causation 
for causal dispositionalism, a power would have to be a manifesta-
tion of its own manifestation. In other words, if causation is a mat-
ter of one power manifesting by bringing about the instantiation of 
a second power, then for this relation to be symmetrical, this second 
power must manifest by bringing about the first power. It is not clear 
that the book example illustrates powers that stand in such a relation. 
Mumford and Anjum go on to argue that causation is non- transitive. 
When a caused b and b caused c, whether a caused c depends on 
whether a disposed towards c. Intuitively, in some cases, it does not 
(173). But sometimes ‘causation can travel down a chain’ (110). How-
ever, non-transitivity poses a problem for simultaneity. Suppose that a 
having power1 at t1 caused b to have power2 at t1; that b retained power2 
until t2; and that b having power2 at t2 caused c to have power3 at t2. 
If causation is not intransitive, it is possible that a having power1 at 
t1 caused c to have power3 at t2. This conflicts with Mumford and An-
jum’s claim that causes do not precede their effects. 
In other chapters, the authors: explain how and why to model cau-
sation with vectors (Ch. 2); elaborate a number of ways in which 
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powers combine (Ch. 4); give an account of causal explanation and 
apparent causation by absence (Ch. 6); distinguish conditionals that 
express causal claims from those that express identity and essential-
ist claims (Ch. 7); elaborate the notion of dispositional modality as 
something more than pure contingency but less than pure necessity 
(Ch. 8); argue that we perceive powers directly in our roles of causal 
agents and patients (Ch. 9); and finally offer causation in biology as 
an exemplification of causal dispositionalism. 
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